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Data from network devices is commonly made available without any regard to, or 
concern, for the ability to provably verify the classification level of the involved data.  The 
owner of a network device frequently will wish to restrict data access, visibility, and 
processing as a policy action.  To address these types of challenges, techniques presented 
herein support a multi-step approach to addressing the issue of how owners of network 
device-generated data may share such data with other parties (e.g., a vendor’s technical 
assistance center, partners, etc.) in a controlled way that respects data and other privacy 
controls and provides verification of the integrity of the data.  The presented techniques 
support, among other things, parsing, objectifying, classifying, verifying, and, optionally, 
encrypting multiple elements of network device-generated data streams and attaching the 
output of such a process as verifiable metadata that is associated with the various network 
data objects thus generated. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Today, data from network devices is made available and exported without any 
regard to, or concern for the ability to provably verify, the classification level of the 
involved data – such as, for example, privacy levels, the presence of personally identifiable 
information (PII) in a data stream, data sovereignty restrictions that may be applicable, etc. 
Such devices generate different types of data and that data may be consumed by a 
range of applications, and, in some instance, different groups of engineers, for various 
reasons.  For example, data such as a ‘show tech’ from a network device, packet captures 
(e.g., PCAP files) from a device, records encompassing Internet Protocol (IP) traffic flows 
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that are traversing a device and which are exported to a central location, and logging (e.g., 
syslog) messages, among other examples, all contain varying amounts of PII data and/or 
other data which for a variety of reasons (even beyond PII) are collected and exchanged 
with a vendor’s technical assistance center engineers for troubleshooting purposes.  On the 
other hand, streaming telemetry data from the devices may be consumed by different 
vendor-developed or certified applications, or customer home-grown open-source 
applications, for analytics, visualization, or optimization purposes.  Such network-
generated data may comprise varying levels of granular information that could be 
employed by malicious users to gain business or infrastructure insight (e.g., how a site is 
connected, the number of internal subnets, etc.) or discover details about potential attack 
vectors (e.g., allowed ports, enabled features, software version, etc. and the associated 
vulnerabilities).  A data owner may wish to restrict various of the above as a policy action. 
However, without the ability to properly segment the data streams, classify the 
segments, and provide provable integrity for the data segments and elements involved – all 
capabilities that are lacking today in network devices – no follow-on policies can be safely 
and comprehensively implemented. 
To address these types of challenges, techniques are presented herein that support, 
among other things, methods to objectize network-generated data streams, classify such 
data object 'chunks' into varying levels of privacy (based on a ring-oriented scheme), attach 
metadata to each sub-objectized data block or chunk, verify that the data objects have not 
been tampered with (either in transit or at rest) thus ensuring data integrity, and finally 
leverage the above to apply different policies to control, for example, data access, visibility, 
and processing. 
In brief, aspects of the techniques presented herein form the basis for follow-on 
organizational and supra-organizational policies regarding who can access data – along 
with options for where, when, why, etc. – thus achieving an organization's goals of 
controlling access to the network device data that the organization generates and shares.  
For example, an organization may elect to share network data with a vendor’s technical 
assistance center, or with a partner, for the purposes of troubleshooting. 
Various of the techniques presented herein support a method and proposed 
apparatus for network device data objectivization, classification, and verification, for the 
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purposes of enabling appropriate data privacy controls, using verified ring-oriented 
metadata that is attached to the original data stream. 
Aspects of the techniques presented herein support a multi-step approach to solving 
the issue of how owners of network device-generated data may share such data with other 
parties (e.g., a vendor’s technical assistance center, partners, etc.) in a controlled way that 
respects PII and other privacy controls and provides verification of the integrity of the data. 
Considering the above, aspects of the techniques presented herein may be 
explicated with the help of an illustrative example which captures the techniques’ basic 
approach.  Such an illustrative example is presented in the narrative below. 
To begin the illustrative example, consider that network data is generated by a 
network device. This may include, for example, ‘show tech’ output, ‘show run’ output, 
records encompassing IP traffic flows that are traversing a device, logging (e.g., syslog) 
messages, or other network device-generated data streams. 
The generated data streams may be directed from the source device (e.g., a vendor-
supplied switch, router, etc.) into a containerized application that is running on the device 
(e.g., running within a ‘guest shell’ under a device’s operating system (OS)).  A 
containerized application is used in the instant example as just one possible approach (e.g., 
providing a faster time-to-market for aspects of the techniques presented herein by 
avoiding the need to code changes to the OS base on the device to implement the below 
described functionality).  However, conceptually this would be identical if the base OS on 
the device also directly provided the below described functionality. 
The containerized application (which for simplicity of exposition may be referred 
to as a Network Data Objectivization and Classification (or NDOC) engine) performs a 
number of functions on the network data stream that is sent to the NDOC engine.  Those 
functions are described in the narrative below. 
The NDOC engine parses an incoming data stream and chunks the data into various 
‘objects,’ with each object corresponding to an element over which differentiated control 
may later be desired.  For example, in a ‘show run’ output objects may include the 
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) portion of the configuration, the 
routing portion, the various interface configurations, etc.  It is important to note that objects 
can be, and most often would be, granular all the way down to individual data items such 
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as IP addresses, port numbers, AS designations, etc.  Objectification is not limited to the 
section level.  This allows for, as an example, an interface-level configuration to later be 
reviewed but to retain control over viewing or use of the IP addresses involved. 
The NDOC engine assigns each object that is parsed within the network data stream 
to a classification level based on a defined ring structure, where Ring 0 is the most private 
and leading out to Ring 'N' being the least private.  A minimum of three ring levels would 
typically be defined for network data streams (supporting highest privacy, medium privacy, 
and lowest privacy), but additional rings may be defined and used, if needed.  The decision 
as to which elements within an incoming network data set would be attached to which 
privacy or security classification level is driven by a rules-based engine that is resident 
within the NDOC.  A network device administrator is able to override such a classification 
level and assign, either temporarily or permanently, a different level if desired.  For 
example, if an administrator determined that for some reason certain data elements that 
normally reside at Ring 1 should be reclassified to Ring 0, at any point in time they could 
make such a designation. 
The NDOC engine leverages an on-device ‘trusted anchor’ module (TaM) (e.g., an 
on-device hardware-anchored immutable basis for a trust chain) to digitally sign each 
network data object that is generated.  This accomplishes two things.  First, it guarantees 
that the network data in fact originated from the origin device that it claims to have 
originated from.  Second, it verifies that this network data object, when it is later reviewed, 
has not been tampered with, either while it was in-flight or while it was at-rest.  
Additionally, the NDOC may attach other metadata to the objects to provide a contextual 
description of where the data originated.  For example, this may include an identifier in the 
networking device describing the country, state, province, federal agency, etc. where the 
device is used. 
The NDOC engine attaches the metadata (e.g., the classification ring level and the 
associated network data object, the ring level digital signature, the contextual information, 
etc.) to each and every network data object element.  Optionally, the NDOC engine can 
encrypt the resulting fleshed-out network object to provide data obfuscation, if desired.  
Note that some network data objects so produced could be encrypted, while others might 
not be encrypted.  If encryption is used, the encryption keys may be controlled by the 
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network data source (typically the owner of the network device) and may be provided to 
the remote possible end-user of the network data object (for example, to a vendor’s 
technical assistance center or to a partner) via an appropriate key distribution method.  In 
this way, the network device owner (typically the customer) can then revoke the keys if 
needed, disallowing access to the data (even when the data is held remotely) by denying 
the ability to decrypt it. 
Finally, to complete the illustrative example, the NDOC engine exports from the 
network device the resulting objectivized, classified, and verified (and, optionally, fully or 
partially encrypted) data elements for off-box processing and use. 
Off-box devices may now use the object-based, classified, and verified series of 
data elements as they see fit.  For example, policies may be put into place such that, for 
example, a vendor’s technical assistance center is able to view and use all Ring 1+ data but 
Ring 0 data (such as, for example, passwords, designated IP addresses, etc.) would be 
restricted, an analytics engine processing the network device data might only be allowed 
Ring 2+ access, and a trusted network administrator might be allowed Ring 0 access. 
It is important to note that while rings often may be concentric (i.e., having Ring 0 
access implies having access to all of the rings above it, having Ring 2 access implies denial 
of the rings below it, etc.), another (e.g., more flexible) access model could also be 
instantiated that could allow differentiated access on a per-user or per-group basis (i.e., to 
override or constrain the ring-based access method, as needed or desired). 
A customer may also stipulate policies that examine other contextual elements of 
the metadata in the data objects, such as preventing certain types of data from being stored 
outside of a data sovereignty region (e.g., a U.S. federal agency router producing data could 
have identifiers preventing a vendor’s technical assistance center from storing those files 
outside of the United States). 
Figure 1, below, depicts how network data may be objectized with different 
metadata policies to control the consumption by different parties according to aspects of 
the techniques presented herein. 
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Figure 1: Illustrative Ring-based Network Data Objectivization 
 
Figure 2, below, presents a very simple example of how a ‘show output’ may be 
objectivized with additional metadata according to aspects of the techniques presented 
herein.  For brevity, just the security level is highlighted and a JavaScript Object Notation 
(JSON) format is employed.  However, such brevity does not imply any implementation 
decisions or limitations. 
 
 
Figure 2: Exemplary Network Data Objectivization 
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The example from Figure 2, above, employs an inventory model and depicts the 
association of different security levels for different data.  The output could always be 
generated as a binary file and so depending upon the security clearance of the user who is 
reading the file the relevant objects may be composed together.  For example, a user with 
maximum security clearance could see the serial number (i.e., SN) in the above output 
while a user from a partner may just see the chassis name (i.e., NAME). 
To briefly summarize the above discussion, the techniques presented herein support 
a novel method and propose an apparatus for parsing, objectifying, classifying, verifying, 
and optionally encrypting multiple elements of network device-generated data streams and 
attaching the output of such a process as verifiable metadata that is associated with the 
various network data objects so generated.  Such capabilities do not exist in network 
devices, or in the industry, today. 
While some of the elements that are found under the techniques presented herein 
(such as the different data elements involved and an on-device ‘trusted anchor’ module in 
network devices) have been available for some time, no current solution exists as a whole 
according to the techniques presented herein – i.e., network device-generated data being 
objectified, classified, and verified with such processing then used to tag verifiable 
metadata onto the resulting network data objects for the purposes of controlling off-box 
network data element usage, distribution, and policy-based controls.  
In particular, aspects of the techniques presented herein focus on chunking the 
desired data into objects, attaching metadata tags that allow each chunk of data to be 
associated with a given level of data sovereignty, and ensuring that the integrity of the data 
chunks is not tampered with – for all aspects of network device-generated data. 
This includes not just configuration files from devices but also data sets that are 
generated by network devices such as records encompassing IP traffic flows that are 
traversing a device, logging (e.g., syslog) messages, or other network device-generated 
data streams, all of which are provided today in a ‘flatter’ format without any associated 
metadata tags or classification information that may be used to support data sovereignty 
efforts.  In contrast, techniques herein provide for the ability to segment, metadata-label, 
and secure all aspects of network-device-generated data with an eye to using these 
chunking, classification, and signing capabilities in support of data sovereignty efforts.   
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Additionally, the techniques presented herein attach a digital signature to any and 
all such device-generated data and metadata, anchored into the immutable on-device 
‘trusted anchor’ module within the device, to ensure that the data and metadata has not 
been tampered with in transit or at rest.  Such an approach is important considering that 
policies surrounding access to the data will be based on the attached metadata 
classifications and the data sovereignty levels that they imply.  This is an important 
consideration given the absence of such capabilities in today’s ‘flat’ and non-chunked 
device-generated data sets. 
It is important to note that a customer cannot control how their data is accessed or 
handled by partners, a vendor’s technical assistance center, or others once the data is out 
of their device or domain.  Consequently, it is the application of the chunking, metadata 
attachment, and digital verification capabilities to all aspects of device-generated data that 
is a key to the techniques presented herein. 
Due to the need to apply complex data sovereignty rules to network device-
generated data, the techniques presented herein add an important new capability to a 
vendor’s network devices and can serve as a critical differentiator between the vendor and 
other vendors’ devices when it comes to the critical area of data sovereignty and control 
for all aspects of network device-generated data streams. 
As the metadata that is attached to each chunk of network-device data is key – that 
metadata can be used subsequently in many different ways for data sovereignty purposes 
– it should be noted that under the flexible techniques presented herein that metadata may 
be generated in several unique ways.  For example, the metadata that is attached to a chunk 
of network device-generated data may be based on a combination of not only the ring level 
but also the context of where a device is located (e.g., is it a core device vs. an access device 
vs. a firewall, etc.).  In this way, the ring level for the metadata may be dynamically defined 
based on the device's role, position within the network, or other factors.  Such a capability 
does not exist today.  Additionally, concerning the use of the metadata, rather than having 
a static set of rules that define what data and data types are associated to which ring level 
as a classifier, at each ring level a machine learning (ML) classifier may be used that takes 
a series of inputs from the associated data stream and subsequently determines the best ring 
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level for all or a portion of the involved network device-generated data.  Such a capability 
does not exist in the industry today. 
Use of the techniques presented herein offers clear visibility.  For example, use may 
be concluded if it is observed that network device data that is being generated (either 
directly or via an adjunct element such as an on-box or off-box container) contains a 
segmented, objectivized version of the network device data, tagged with metadata 
concerning classification levels, and verified by a digital signature or similar mechanism 
to avoid data tampering. 
The techniques presented herein will be extremely useful for any entity wishing to, 
or needing to, control access to their network device generated data once that data leaves 
the network device.  The classification (using a ring-based metadata system) provides a 
flexible method of network device data classification and integrity verification, upon which 
a separate but associated policy infrastructure for appropriate data access may be created.  
A customer subject to data sharing restrictions (organizational, geographical, or otherwise) 
will find the techniques presented herein particularly useful. 
In summary, techniques have been presented herein that support a multi-step 
approach to solving the issue of how owners of network device-generated data may share 
such data with other parties (e.g., a vendor’s technical assistance center, partners, etc.) in a 
controlled way that respects data and other privacy controls and provides verification of 
the integrity of the data.  The presented techniques support, among other things, parsing, 
objectifying, classifying, verifying, and optionally encrypting multiple elements of 
network device-generated data streams and attaching the output of such a process as 
verifiable metadata that is associated with the various network data objects thus generated. 
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